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Abstract 
The aim of this piece is to clarify three key matters: (a) the extent to which, as citizens, our 
volition is impacted as a result of the implementation of nudges in the health domain; (b) the 
efficacy of educational campaigns as a means of behavioral change relative to other nudges as 
well as typical regulatory instruments; and (c) the empirical, theoretical, and practical details 
that ethical debates concerning nudges might want to consider. 
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A few points of clarification are needed so that our position on important matters is explicitly 
made before we embark on a direct response to the provocative and interesting comments by 
Marjanovic (2017/this issue).  and by Rauh (2017/this issue). The first matter concerns the 
starting point of our review (Lin, Osman, & Ashcroft, 2017/this issue). The nudges are applied 
in most aspects that concern health, wealth, and well-being. Their wide acceptance as a method 
of behavioral change motivated the reason behind us carefully evaluating the theoretical 
foundations that explains how nudges work, not in principle as suggested by Marjanovic but in 
practice. The pervasiveness of nudges is also the reason behind us examining the empirical 
support for nudges. Many practitioners and policymakers are persuaded to use nudges, and so 
this audience should be given a means of making an informed choice based on the efficacy of 
nudges in the health domain. 
The second matter of clarification concerns the theoretical evaluation of the dual-system 
framework that underpins nudges. After discussing the insurmountable issues with the dual-
system framework, we present a way of conceptualizing the theory behind nudges from a 
single-system framework. Proposing a single system account of choice behavior is not simply 
updating a dual-system account (Majanovic, 2017/this issue). It stands in contrast to, and is an 
alternative to, a dual-system account. If there were any ambiguity that we do not side with a 
dual-system framework, the reader might like to consult work critiquing the dual-system 
framework (De Neys, Cromheeke, & Osman, 2011; Osman, 2004, 2007, 2010, 2013, 2014, 
2016; Osman & Stavy, 2006). Suffice it to say, based on considerable work dedicated to 
empirically and theoretically evaluating the dual-system framework, we do not find any sound 
theoretical or good empirical support for this framework, and it is certainly not a good basis 
for explaining the way nudges might work. 
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The third point of clarification is that we do not suggest that most of the bad decisions that 
people make are the result of biased automatic thinking (Majanovic, 2017/this issue) and that, 
by contrast, all good decisions are based on analytic slow thinking. Given our point of 
clarification with respect to our theoretical position, it should be clear that rendering bad 
decisions, the result of biased thinking is a far too simplistic explanation. We redirect the reader 
to the section of our review titled “Critical Issues With Dual-System Theories.” Also, a point 
related to biased thinking and poor choices, we report evidence from a meta-analysis that 
concludes the knowledge of opaque nudges does impact the way they work (Holden, Zlatevska, 
& Dubelaar, 2016). However, we do not propose, as Raul proposes, that opaque nudges (i.e., 
behavioral methods designed to target unconscious processes) cease to work when people are 
armed with enough knowledge about them—a point also often made by philosophers (Bovens, 
2009; Grune-Yanoff, 2012). There is no evidence to show that by telling people how an 
unconscious nudge might work (e.g., smaller plates will mean you eat less food), like a magic 
trick, people see through the disguise, and so it is no longer effective. Actually, in the context 
of food and smaller plate sizes, and smaller packaging, awareness of the aim of the intervention, 
and/or awareness of food intake being monitored experimentally, contradicts this. Knowing 
how an opaque nudge works is at worst benign (Wansink, 2007) but more often likely to 
increase behavioral change in the “nudged” direction (Robinson, Kersbergen, Brunstrom, & 
Field, 2014; Robinson, Proctor, Oldham, & Masic, 2016).  
At the heart of concerns around bad decision making, and the means of correcting it, is a deeply 
rooted worry—that opaque nudges are an imposition on our liberty, because they are designed 
to change our behavior without our awareness. We can comfortably say here, and reiterate what 
we presented in the review, that there is no reliable evidence to show that opaque nudges 
operate unconsciously in the first place. The most likely, but unfortunately the most prosaic, 
reason for opaque nudges not working is that they are incapable of achieving what they are 
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purported to do, which is correct an unconscious bias by tapping into unconscious processes, 
aside from the fact that bad decisions are not typically the result of biased unconscious 
processes. It is useful here to draw a parallel with a similar concern that arose in the context of 
advertising. The public and the academic community shared a deep worry about mind control 
via subliminal advertising (commercial and state) in the 1950s (and since), which in fact turned 
out to be a hoax (for discussion, see Osman, 2014). Even though there is no good evidence for 
controlling minds by tapping into the unconscious, the greater worry seems to be that the idea 
is still being perpetuated, and so many of us are willing to believe it. 
In the remaining discussion we address three main points our commentators have made. 
Contribution for the loss of volition 
Majanovic (2017/this issue) comments that there are factors beyond our control, such as 
genetics and the course of aging, that make us susceptible to cardiovascular disease. However, 
he also notes that there are lifestyle choices we can make that are, to a large degree, under our 
control and that reduce our risk of cardiovascular disease (e.g., whether or not we smoke—and 
if we do, how much; whether or not we drink alcohol—and if we do, how much; whether or 
not we eat a balanced diet/exercise, etc.). Given that so many people struggle in regulating their 
lifestyle choices consistently toward good health behaviors, nudges step in to steer people 
toward the direction of positive outcomes and away from negative ones. This is with the 
assumption that people generally want to experience long-term positive outcomes; one might 
want to consult the many philosophical debates on the matter of whether this is ethically viable 
(Bovens, 2009; Grune-Yanoff, 2012; Schmidt, 2017). As Majanovic sets out, promoting and 
supporting positive health outcome is what nudges set out to do, and on this point Majanovic 
concludes that our loss of volition is the price we pay for this endeavor, which is a major 
problem given that a sign of our times is our preoccupation with taking back personal, political, 
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economic, and social control (McLeish, 2017). But we really don’t need to have any contrition 
for the loss of volition with respect to nudges based on empirical evidence. So far, there just 
isn’t any evidence that our volition is practically under threat from nudges, but the review does 
show that there is a considerable gulf between the goals that practitioners and policymakers 
have in mind and what nudges can actually deliver. Nevertheless, as severe are our conclusion 
is, and as strong a critique as it is for nudges, Majanovic and Raul seem to be left wanting more 
around the subject of volition, and so we take the opportunity to discuss this in two contexts: 
ethical issues and the importance of demographics. 
Blatantly curbing agency 
In the section “Ethical Implications” (Lin et al., 2017/this issue), the essence of what we are 
getting at is that opaque nudges are exceptionally hard to defend. As we show, the explanation 
for why opaque nudges work is deeply flawed, the evidence for opaque nudges working is both 
weak and rare, the public like them far less than they do transparent nudges, and ethically they 
are problematic. As Raul (2017/this issue) points out, our approach to tackling ethical concerns 
around nudge and its impact on our personal control and agency is a practical one. We take 
some time here to illustrate why taking this approach has some traction, and we hope that it 
also addresses the seeming shortfall in our discussion on the subject that our commentators 
allude to. 
Given the wealth of academic papers debating the ethics of nudge, has anything changed as a 
response? The answer depends on the audience being targeted. Sunstein’s (2016) recent retort 
to many academic detractors is that if one takes issue with nudges and their imposition on 
agency, then one must also take issue with the way the world works. Nudges are, in some form 
or another, everywhere, and each of us manipulate others on some level fairly regularly. This 
argument, though poor (Osman, 2016; Schmidt, 2017), is a bold defense from the attacks 
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nudges face in the ethical arena, and it provides a handy mantra that choice architects can use 
to keep them in worriless sleep. By contrast, in a recent paper (Benartzi et al., 2017) designed 
to convince governments just how cost effective nudges are and why more money should be 
directed toward implementing them, the ethics debate is not mentioned once. But it is revealing 
that only one of the seven nudges referred to (none of which were in the health domain) would 
typically count as an opaque nudge, and even by their own calculations the authors show it to 
be less effective than virtually all other nudges, as well as typical regulatory methods. 
Moreover, the poster child of nudges—automatic defaults in the organ procurement domain—
was not discussed at all; there are many reasons to suggest that they are simply not effective in 
increasing actual organ donations (Lin, Osman, Harris, & Read, 2017). The nudge techniques 
that the paper advocates are transparent. They are designed to improve the quality of the 
information on which people make choices, or else improve the opportunities for people to 
make active choices. One could take issue with the methods used to show their cost efficiency, 
but it’s harder to take issue with the types of behavioral methods they are arguing should be 
rolled out. After all, they are in line with the kinds of interventions for which the public has 
shown an appetite, and to which researchers and philosophers have been more sympathetic. In 
their recent paper (Benartzi et al., 2017), Thaler and Sunstein are clearly taking note of practical 
factors that in turn point to the same conclusion as the ethical issues. Although one could ask, 
does it matter that nudge advocates are taking opaque nudges off the table for pragmatic rather 
than ethical reasons?  
Availability of agency’s perceptibility 
As Majanovic rightly pointed out, our review doesn’t discuss demographic factors; instead it 
focuses on the psychological processes that nudges are designed to tap into and behavioral 
outcomes they are purported to achieve. But the critical point that Majanovic (2017/this issue) 
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makes in relation to this miscasts our argument. At the end of the first section of the review we 
present an alternative conceptualization of nudges that differ in degree rather than kind; Type 
1 and Type 2 nudges differ based on the extent to which they prompt people to reevaluate their 
choices. Do we also end that section by suggesting that ultimately most of the variance in bad 
behavior is down to cognitive factors, such as biased automatic thinking, at the exclusion of 
noncognitive factors (e.g., education, socioeconomic status [SES], motivation)? Put simply, 
no, we do not. It is certainly the case that we did not discuss two of these factors (motivation 
is a factor we did discuss throughout the review), but we have been generously granted the 
opportunity to now discuss how these factors have a bearing on the topic of volition and nudges. 
Let us consider what the essence of Majanovic’s (2017/this issue) argument might be, and 
actually how it relates to volition. Low education and low SES are (Stringhini et al., 2017; 
Winkleby, Jatulis, Frank, & Fortmann, 1992), and even perceived classism (Simons, Koster, 
Groffen, & Bosma, 2017) are reported closely linked to poor health behaviors, which in turn 
result in poor health outcomes. Although genetics seem to directly impact health outcomes, the 
environmental conditions in which people live in impacts health outcomes indirectly through 
health behaviors. This seems like a legitimate cause for concern because it undermines the view 
that we can all change our lifestyle choices, which will lead to improvements in our health 
behaviors and health outcomes. Put another way, volition over lifestyles choices is reserved 
only for the educated and those with high SES. Is this really the case? Because if it is, then 
there is simply no room for behavioral change for a disadvantaged majority. 
Smoking is a good test case. Those with a low SES are more likely to start smoking early, less 
likely to quit successfully, and more likely to be exposed to the harmful consequences of 
tobacco smoking (Gilman, Abrams, & Buka, 2003; Hiscock, Bauld, Amos, Fidler, & Munafò, 
2012). Clearly SES is a relevant factor in explaining the prevalence of smoking and in turn 
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noncommunicable diseases in poorer and less educated populations. Is there any psychological 
link between SES and greater resistance to behavioral change in smoking behavior? There 
appears to be on the basis of perceptions of volition. Perceived control and sense of agency 
around health behaviors is experienced to a lesser degree in low SES than higher SES (Bailis, 
Segall, Mahon, Chipperfield, & Dunn, 2001; Vasiljevic, Ng, Griffin, Sutton, & Marteau, 2016). 
Psychology would benefit more from focusing on the interplay between SES and health 
behaviors (Schüz, 2017) but also how these two factors interact with perceptions of 
control/agency and motivations for behavioral change (Ashcroft, 2011; Blue, Shove, Carmona, 
& Kelly, 2016). In this regard, there are a variety of interventions that can work for different 
samples (low vs. high SES), but this requires systematic comparisons of interventions that take 
into account the impact on different SES groups (Brown, Platt, & Amos, 2014). The point from 
all this is that it may be harder for some groups to perceive their own agency because the means 
are harder, motivation is lower, and the sense of agency is fragile, but that only means that 
better efforts are needed to support agency, conditional on the premise that the motivation for 
behavioral change exists once relevant information about one’s behavior is known. 
The nudge strategy is to target a very narrow idea of what the choice environment is, and the 
context in which it is situated, in order to maximize behavioral change for the greatest number 
of individuals. It is designed to work on an aggregate level, and so for efficiency sake, a one-
size-fits-all choice environment is the one typically constructed. Taking factors such as SES, 
education, value systems, motivation, economic climate, cultural climate, and political climate, 
into account is not something that nudge set out to do (Osman, 2016). So, the point regarding 
factors such as education or SES are incredibly important to bear in mind when considering 
what types of interventions to use in social policy domains, and where volition needs to be 
bolstered.  
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Nullification of the impact of education 
Given that one of the core conclusions we can draw from our critical discussion of the dual-
system framework, and the evidence in support of nudges, is that if there is any meaningful 
behavioral change to be achieved practitioners/policymakers need to play the long game. We 
propose that, of the variety of nudges that are currently being employed, educational campaigns 
are the most fruitful. Raul (2017/this issue) suggests that their success depends on the general 
public’s savviness on social policy. Does it? Our view on this is that an educational campaign 
is based on information that explains the need to change behavior (e.g., a new scientific report), 
it doesn’t require an understanding of public policy structures behind the campaign. 
Nevertheless, extending Raul’s point, perhaps an even more general one can be raised, such as, 
how much can educational campaigns achieve? We would argue, based on our review of the 
findings, that relative to other nudges, educational campaigns tend to be more effective. But 
how do they stand up against typical regulatory policy instruments? 
For instance, the global rates of smoking cessation have reduced (1990–2015) by 
approximately 30% since 1990, and this has been achieved through a combination of strategies 
implemented over a considerable period that include taxes, bans, and mandates, as well as 
educational campaigns (Reitsma et al., 2015). The campaigns themselves are devised with 
audiences in mind and have been shown to be particularly effective (Blue et al., 2016). What 
more could be done, and does it require more educational campaigns? There are 
misconceptions that exist across all age groups regarding smoking (e.g., that cigarette filters 
remove all harmful chemicals from cigarette smoke such as uranium, lead, hydrogen cyanide, 
arsenic, ammonia; Brewer et al., 2016). The lesson learned in the domain of smoking cessation 
is an important one. If long-term strategies are put in place, and a combination of behavioral 
and typical regulatory methods are used, then it is likely that a positive health outcome is going 
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to be greater than any individual method alone. The problem for practitioners and policymakers 
is that they cannot always rely on good empirical support, because it is hard to estimate which 
combination of methods is most effective, given that in practice multiple methods are used at 
once.  
The purity and probability of utility 
Our presentation of nudges and the theory behind them generally states that Type 1 nudges, 
which minimally prompt the individual to question their choice behavior differs in degree from 
a Type 2 nudge that generates substantial reevaluation and questioning of the motives, reasons, 
and needs for choosing one option over another (Wilding et al., 2016). More to the point, we 
argue that for theoretical and empirical reasons the focus should be on Type 2 nudges, which 
is consistent with many ethicists. But this doesn’t by default commit us to a utilitarian position 
as claimed by Raul. From our point of view neither type of nudge, based on the specific nudges 
we refer to in our review, poses a threat to a utilitarian, republican, Kantian, and Rousseauvian 
perspective on freedom. Raul conflates two distinct debates in moral philosophy: the debate 
around how we justify and explain moral norms (so-called normative ethics) and the debate 
around the connection between moral norms and human psychology in action. Clearly these 
debates have a lot to say to one another, but one’s empirically model of moral cognition does 
not fix or exhaust what we should say about how we justify particular moral norms. Nor, as 
Raul proposes, does it render a situation in which a Type 2 nudge is akin to a mandate if it 
encourages an action where an individual’s subjective probability of performing that action 
differs from the actual probability of that action occurring. It seems highly irregular to imply 
that a mandate sets up conditions in which people’s estimates of likely generating an action fall 
short of their actual chances of performing it. Nevertheless, the essential point that Raul implies 
in his discussion does require an equally thoughtful response, and that is, what moral position 
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do we take with respect to behavioral interventions? When thinking about the three main 
philosophical positions (liberalism, utilitarianism, communitarianism) and their application to 
the health domain. Each of the three main positions asserts its own value system on what, and 
how, some things should be prioritized over others. We are of the view that thus far none 
adequately handle the core problems concerning if, or how, the state should intervene, and what 
position best captures what counts as good (Roberts & Reich, 2002; Seidman & Atun, 2016). 
Also, as empiricists we do not necessarily have to side with any position, but what we should 
do is accurately reveal how different value systems set the conditions for behavioral change, 
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